Historical Context
The partition (1947), a haphazard decision by the departing British empire, to divide the Indian subcontinent motivated by communal divide, political and vested interests, has led to decades long security crisis within the geographical region. The mass-massacre & bloodshed, displacement of millions of people, atrocities on human beings, especially women were obvious security issues which were to be tackled, yet proved to be a failure of both the Muslim League as well the Indian National Congress, as horrors of the partition still echo throughout North & East India.
The post-partition war (1947-48), proved that amongst the two states, there was a perceived threat from each other and due to vested & national interests, direct military confrontation was inevitable. However, apart from the obvious, which is security threats in a traditional, realist sense, there arose threats which were ‘non-traditional’ in nature. The mindlessly drawn Radcliffe Line alongwith, brought a range of non‑traditional security threats which were majorly rooted in demographics & resource distribution. This not only fueled turmoil among the two nations, but also significantly impacted the sub-continents security & strategic landscape.
Water Insecurity & Strategic Leverage
The first Indo-Pak war fought in 1947, was over the Kashmir region, which is also the place of origin for the Indus River and its tributaries. The Indus River system, comprising the Indus and its five tributaries (Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej), was vital for irrigation in the Punjab region, a major agricultural hub.
In the aftermath of partition, Punjab was divided into two, with many of its canals watering the fields in the newly cut out Pakistan-Punjab. However these canals still drew their water from the dam‑like headworks that now sat on India’s side of the border. Due to this, Pakistan’s farms relied on water it no longer controlled leaving them in a position of vulnerability; a major non-traditional security threat, which meandered over the newly born nation. As the war ended in 1948, India in abeyance to a standstill agreement, stopped the water from flowing in the canals of Pakistan through the headworks they had control over. This reinforced Pakistan’s suspicion, leading them to thrive for a more substantial and formal agreement for water-sharing.
The Indus river system is such that both the nations rely heavily on hydropower as well as irrigation. It irrigates over 26 million acres of farmland, primarily in Pakistan’s Punjab and Sindh provinces and India’s Punjab and Rajasthan states. If there are disruptions within this system, it directly threatens food security and economic stability of both countries.
However, India holds a strategic advantage as geographically, we are an upper riparian state, as the Indus and its tributaries originate or flow through Indian territory before entering Pakistan giving India the control to regulate water flow to downstream Pakistan. The hydrological, and infrastructural positioning of India also provides us leverage over Pakistan in the management of the Indus River system.
Indus Water Treaty, 1960
The aforementioned highlights that there was urgency for a formal treaty to allocate water rights fairly, addressing Pakistan’s downstream vulnerabilities and India’s upstream control. In the early 1950s the World Bank initiated talks bringing both the Indian and Pakistani delegations together.
However, early negotiations were contentious as both sides proposed plans which favoured their national interests. Pakistan at a disadvantage being the lower riparian state, sought guarantees against water stoppage, while India aimed to maximize its use of the eastern tributaries through building hydro-powered infrastructure which would provide for its citizens & act as a potent tool during times of conflict.
In 1954, the World Bank proposed a division of the rivers in which India would have exclusive use of the eastern rivers namely; Ravi, Beas, & Sutlej. Whereas Pakistan would control the western rivers Indus, Jhelum & Chenab. This proposal is largely considered to be a middle ground for the treaty.
In accordance with the treaty, India could use limited water from the western rivers for non-consumptive purposes i.e., hydropower and domestic use. India could only build ‘run-of-the-river’ dams on western rivers, subject to design restrictions to avoid disrupting Pakistan’s water supply. Contrarily, Pakistan was to develop replacement canals to divert water from western rivers to compensate for the loss of eastern rivers.
Consequently, technical discussions were held to address issues such as water flow data, storage, and infrastructure. A bilateral body was established to monitor implementation, share data, and resolve disputes. The treaty outlined a graded mechanism for negotiation which had neutral experts assigned by the World Bank, and if necessary, the matter could be taken to arbitration or the International Court of Justice.
The World Bank not only mediated the treaty but also facilitated funding for its infrastructure. It brokered $900 million from the U.S., U.K., Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Germany to help Pakistan build dams (e.g., Tarbela, Mangla) and canals to replace water dependency from the eastern sources or rivers.
After 9 years of negotiations, the then Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Pakistani President Ayub Khan signed the treaty in Karachi on September 19, 1960. The World Bank was a signatory as a guarantor of certain provisions. The treaty was ratified in January 1961 and had remained in force until the recent barbarian & inhumane terrorist attack in Pahalgam compelling India to suspend the treaty.
Zero-Tolerance Policy
In response to the horrendous act on 23rd April, during a Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) meeting chaired by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the government of India has chosen to leverage its strategic advantage. Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri stated that India would be in abeyance of the Indus Water Treaty & would remain in effect until Pakistan "credibly and irrevocably abjures its support for cross-border terrorism".
Water nationalism, wherein water is wielded as an instrument of geopolitical leverage rather than managed as a shared resource, is clearly evident in India’s suspension of the Indus Water Treaty. It is a decisive response to Pakistan’s persistent support for terrorism.
While cooperative frameworks and joint water management were often suggested as paths to peace, sustained aggression and persistent inaction on cross-border terrorism make such optimism unrealistic and absurd. These actions are inseparable from the larger set of unresolved disputes, especially Kashmir and Pakistan’s continued role in promoting militancy.
Conclusion
India's suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty strategically benefits India as it enhances control over the Indus River system, especially the western rivers Indus, Jhelum & Chenab that originate in the Indian-controlled territory itself. This allows us to leverage water as a geopolitical tool, potentially diverting or managing flows to pressure Pakistan.
India gains more & more flexibility to pursue hydropower and irrigation projects without treaty constraints supporting its developmental goals in Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh as seen in prior investments in projects. The suspension also strengthens India’s diplomatic stance projecting immense resolve against cross-border terrorism while rallying domestic as well as international support amid heightened national security concerns post-Pahalgam.
Suchit Goel